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Chris Beckett 
 
In the flyer for the ‘Ethics that Work’ conference organized by this journal in November 2008, 
we raised the question as to whether teaching, writing and research about ethics in the social 
welfare field provided students with effective tools that they could ‘actually use to guide their 
practice and help them resolve practice dilemmas’. Or was it possible, we asked, that 
professional education in reality offered ‘little more than rhetorical devices − /approved 
buzzwords and noble-sounding sentiments − /that can be bolted on as necessary after the 
event, but have very little impact on actual practice decisions’? 
 
Such concerns are quite widely shared. Eileen Gambrill, for instance, worries that ‘lingering at 
the level of vague discourse − about empowerment for example which appeals to our 
emotions − lulls into abeyance our critical appraisal of what services clients receive (or do 
not), to what effect…’ (2009, p. xviii). Russell Harbin contends that the code of practice of the 
National Association of Social Workers ‘neglects the greatest range of actual cases of difficult 
moral choices’ that social workers in practice are actually confronted with. As a result, he 
goes on to say, ‘Not only will they be unable to fulfil the grandiose principles of their ethics 
codes, but they will typically have no categories to apply to the difficult moral choices that they 
have to make’ (Harbin 1990, p. 540). In a similar vein, I myself previously argued here that 
recommendations of the kind contained in Lord Laming’s report into the death of Victoria 
Climbie´ (2003) 
 
are in fact no more than ‘wishlists’ [which] pretend to offer solutions to a problem but in 
fact…ignore the single aspect of the problem that really is difficult for those on the ground, 
merely passing this back to them to struggle with. (Beckett 2007, p. 278) 
 
One subject we seem to be particularly uncomfortable about in the social welfare field is the 
matter of control. I do not suggest that the control over people that is exercised by social 
welfare agencies is a secret, nor even that it is never discussed, but I do suggest that it is 
played down to a striking extent. For instance, given the extent to which my own profession of 
social work is engaged in exercising control over people, it is surprising what a small 
proportion of the profession’s ‘ethics talk’ directly confronts the particular ethical issues that 
this raises. I recently asked a group of child and family social workers what percentage of 
their service users they thought were involuntary ones. Their short answer was ‘most’. But 
although child and family social workers constitute a large part of the British social work 
workforce, and although other social work specialisms (notably mental health social work) 
also have quite explicit controlling functions, not to mention many subtle and implicit ones, it is 
surprising how little discussion there is, in our codes of ethics or in the standard texts used in 
social work education, of the particular ethical issues involved in working with people who 
have no choice but to work with us. I wonder whether the same is not also true of other 
human service professions? 
 
The thinking behind this special issue, then, is that we in the social welfare field ought to 
engage more in thinking about the ethical principles that apply when we are involved in 
control. When is it morally justified to exercise control over others? What ethical principles 
should apply when we do? How do we square the exercise of control with our other 
commitments: to empower, to work in partnership, to promote self-determination? What effect 
does our ability to coerce have on our relationships with those with whom we work? What 
safeguards need to be put in place to prevent abuses? We may be uncomfortable about 
control. We might prefer not to be engaged in it. But if we think, teach and write about ethics 
in relation to a field where exercising control is part of the job, then we need to think, teach 
and write about the ethical issues that this raises, and not merely mention control and then 
move quickly on to more pleasant subjects. I do not pretend that this special issue covers all 
of the questions raised above in any sort of systematic way, but I hope that it will contribute to 
debate and open up more discussion of this subject in the future in the pages of Ethics & 
Social Welfare and elsewhere. 
Each contributor has approached the topic of the special issue in a very different way. The 
following brief overview does not attempt to summarize the whole argument, or even 
necessarily the main issues offered by each, but aims to give at least a flavour of the content 
of the issue by picking out a few points from each contribution and noting a few common 
themes. 
 
Articles 
 
Kerstin Svensson, from the University of Lund in Sweden, drawing on previous work with 
Swedish volunteers and social workers, explores the ways in which workers reconcile their 
involvement in control with their own desire to see themselves as helpful and supportive. (She 
points out, incidentally, that there is a ‘control’ element in even the most apparently voluntary 
and supportive service.) She makes a series of points which link very closely to the rationale 
for this special issue as a whole. If control is ‘ignored, separated and rewritten’, she warns, or 
if we assume that our own goodness justifies controlling actions, ‘there is a risk that social 
work will contain much more control than we are aware of’ (p. 246). 
 
Jim Campbell and Gavin Davidson, both from Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
reflect on their experiences as Approved Social Workers under UK law with powers to apply 
for the compulsory detention of people defined as suffering from a ‘mental disorder’. (As we’ll 
see, two contributors to the ‘Ethical Issues in Practice’ section also draw on such 
experiences.) They explore the grounds on which this kind of coercion, and other more subtle 
forms, may be justified, and the proper basis on which decisions about it should be made. 
One of the points they make is that coercion exercised under formal legal powers can ‘offer a 
greater degree of transparency and guidance for practitioners and clients’ (p. 253) than 
informal coercion resulting from a combination of persuasion and threats in the guise of ‘fair 
warning’. Another point is that how coercion is used and presented, as much as the simple 
fact of its use, may be an important factor in determining how damaging the experience is for 
those on the receiving end. 
 
Donald Dickson, at Rutgers University, New Jersey, explores the coercive powers used in 
child protection work in the US context, where the legal situation varies from state to state. In 
particular, he considers the tensions, sometimes considerable, between what is legal and 
what is ethical in terms of the various professional codes of conduct. One of his concerns is 
that human service professionals may at times be pressured to take coercive courses of 
action which may be, or appear to be, legal but are unethical nevertheless. This is a particular 
danger, he suggests, because of the balance of power being typically hugely skewed against 
the service user, so that the professional is more likely to feel most pressure from other 
sources such as law enforcement agencies, rather than from family members. This dynamic 
is certainly one that is familiar to me from a UK context, and it is very similar to a dynamic 
eloquently described by Malcolm Kinney in the ‘Ethical Issues in Practice’ section, though 
Kinney is writing about a different jurisdiction and a different area of work. Dickson’s 
observations on the misuse of so-called Voluntary Placement Agreements echo comments in 
the previous article on the dangers of informal forms of coercion that can be less transparent 
and less easy to challenge than more formal ones. They also remind us of the capacity for 
Orwellian doublespeak that exists in a social welfare system in which ‘voluntary’ may mean 
no choice at all. 
 
Suzanne Fitzpatrick and Sarah Johnsen, at the Centre for Housing Policy at the University of 
York, discuss the coercive powers which in English law are used in an attempt to regulate or 
change ‘street culture’, and consider the ethical basis for the use of coercion in this context. 
They argue that such measures can sometimes be justified on social justice grounds. One 
interesting finding is that some of the homeless people who have been subjected to these 
coercive measures identify them as having turned out to be positive and helpful: a necessary 
jolt that became a catalyst for change. The application of coercive powers does inevitably 
create a crisis, a point at which things cannot go on exactly as before, and this can be 
positive. However, this is, of course, not necessarily the case, and Fitzpatrick and Johnsen do 
also identify ways in which the use of these powers can be unhelpful and indeed counter-
productive. 
Even Nilssen and Nanna Kildal, both at the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University 
of Bergen, conclude this section of the journal with some observations on a shift in Norwegian 
social policy towards a ‘contractualist’ approach based on supposed mutual obligations 
between the recipients of welfare provision and the state rather than on an absolute right to 
such provision. They unpick some of the philosophical assumptions that underlie this shift and 
question the validity of the idea of a contract in a situation in which there are such huge power 
differentials between the supposed parties to the agreement. I am uneasily reminded of my 
own experiences of the use of ‘contracts’ and ‘agreements’ in work with parents in the context 
of child and family social work in the United Kingdom, and I am reminded too of the heavy use 
of the word ‘partnership’ in current British discourse about social work and social welfare, a 
word which likewise seems to sweep huge power differentials under the carpet. Echoing 
themes I noted in previous articles about Orwellian language and the insidious nature of 
covert means of control, Nilssen and Kildal remind us that the state can easily increase its 
control over welfare recipients under the cloak of choice and empowerment. In social welfare, 
policies do not necessarily do what it says on the tin. 
 
Ethical Issues in Practice 
 
This section (edited for this issue, as for other issues, by Andrew Maynard and Beverley 
Burke) as usual includes articles written in a more personal and less formal style and from a 
perspective that is close to actual practice, whether from the perspective of service users or 
practitioners, but it continues with the ‘ethics of control’ theme. 
 
Hazel Davies is a tireless and very experienced advocate for parents embroiled in child 
protection investigations and interventions in Essex in England. Her concern in this article is 
not so much to question the ethical basis for the existence of coercive powers but rather 
(echoing one of the points made by Campbell and Davidson) to explore the ethics of their 
actual use in practice, the desensitizing effect they can have on those who wield them, and 
the disabling effects they can have on those subjected to them. I was struck by the phrasing 
of her assertion (on p. 325) that control over others should only be exercised by those who 
themselves are ‘in submission’ to a coherent set of values, and not simply to the exigencies of 
an ‘impersonal bureaucracy’. This idea of placing one’s powers under submission to values is 
surely the core idea underlying the whole notion of professional ethics. 
 
Malcolm Kinney and Chris Yianni are based, respectively, at Liverpool John Moores 
University and Manchester Metropolitan University in England. Both, like Campbell and 
Davidson earlier, draw on their experiences as Approved Social Workers under UK law. I 
myself have some limited experience of working in this role, as well as experience of 
exercising coercive powers under the 1989 Children Act and its predecessors, and I find 
aspects of Kinney’s account hauntingly and uncomfortably familiar. He vividly describes the 
pressures and expectations (similar to those mentioned earlier by Donald Dickson) that can 
result in a professional feeling pressured into using coercive powers in a way that, deep 
down, he knows is not necessary and not in the best interests of his service user. 
 
Chris Yianni also speaks of these pressures, though his paper is more of a tour of the 
competing issues and principles involved in these decisions. He finishes with a point that 
seems an appropriate ending for this special issue when he observes that it is too simple to 
see ‘care’ and ‘control’ as two opposite ends of a spectrum: ‘the former is sometimes only 
facilitated by the use of the latter’ (p. 000). 
 
Care and control are very closely intertwined. Control can indeed itself be an expression of 
care rather than its opposite (think of a parent closely managing a small child by the side of a 
busy road), but it can also be oppressive and uncaring, as Hazel Davies describes. And as 
we have seen, this applies to the covert, implicit forms of control that we may exercise without 
even being aware of it ourselves, as well as to the more overt and explicit forms of control. 
Echoing Kerstin Svensson, I suggest we need to become more self-aware about control, 
however well intentioned, and more willing to ask ourselves questions about the ethical issues 
it raises. 
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